In this paper, we examine the intersection between two important aspects of climate policy design. The first is the point of regulation. Should it be placed on pollution sources, carbonrich inputs, or consumers? This issue of upstream versus downstream regulation is one that we will refer to as vertical targeting. The second aspect concerns the external effects of a local climate policy. Leakage occurs when partial regulation results in an increase in emissions in unregulated parts of the economy. This paper examines how regulators' choice of upstream versus downstream environmental regulation affects emissions in other countries with lax environmental regulation.
These two elements of climate policy are closely related. In many contexts, the selection of the point of regulation in the vertical chain is influenced, if not driven by, concerns over extrajurisdictional impacts. Given the global nature of the pollutant, regulators in any specific jurisdiction need to be mindful of how local limits will effect global emissions. Regions imposing greenhouse gas restrictions may consume more than they produce of carbon-intensive goods, such as gasoline or cement. In such cases, regulations imposed on consumers can "reach" upstream to producers located outside of the regulated areas. For example, by raising the cost of consuming carbon-intensive electricity in California, regulators in that state hope to reduce the combustion of coal in other regions of the western United States.
It is important to recognize that vertical targeting is but one mechanism through which regulators can combat leakage. Much academic research and legislation has focused on the legal and economic merits of "border adjustments," such as import tariffs based upon carbon-content, and also the "updating" of emis- sions credit allocations in a fashion that can subsidize domestic production. 1 These mechanisms can mitigate leakage effectively, although many legal and regulatory questions remain regarding their implementation within the confines of international trade agreements (Jeffrey Frankel, 2008) or the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Vertical targeting can be viewed as an alternative to border adjustments that is less vulnerable to such conflicts.
In addition to leakage, vertical targeting has implications for cost effectiveness, transactions costs, and offsets. Direct regulation allows firms to achieve the lowest compliance costs: they may abate emissions by changing inputs, output levels, or end-of-pipe technology. However, the transactions costs of monitoring and enforcing regulation for millions of cars and buildings could dwarf the incremental benefits from direct regulation. Upstream regulation could substantially reduce these transactions costs (Gilbert Metcalf and David Weisbach, 2009 Fowlie, Mar Reguant, and Stephen Ryan (2010) and Bushnell and Yihsu Chen (2009) . In a broader context, the pollution havens hypothesis literature examines the interaction between environmental regulation and international trade (Bryan Copeland and Scott Taylor, 2004) . 2 In particular, the authors show that regulating a few thousand fossil-fuel producing companies would account for 80 percent of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. By including some select non-fossil polluters, an additional 10 percent of total emissions would be regulated with modest transactions costs. 3 In this case, regulators may offer firms credit for installing end-of-pipe abatement technologies. These credits can partially offset firms' regulatory obligations. On the one hand, this may
I. Vertical Targeting and Leakage
The interaction between vertical targeting and leakage can be complex. First, there are several points in the supply chain of interest, ranging from fundamental inputs such as fossil fuels, to the production of intermediate products such as fertilizer or cement, to the consumption of the final product. In some cases the act of consumption can create significant emissions (e.g., gasoline), while in others the bulk of the emissions are created in the production of the product (e.g., cement).
Further, there can be great heterogeneity in the upstream or "life-cycle" carbon content of some otherwise identical commodities, such as electricity or ethanol. In such cases, regulating the downstream consumption of a product based upon its specific upstream carbon content can create incentives to manipulate those measurements (Benjamin Hobbs, Bushnell, and Frank Wolak, 2010) as well as lead to the reshuffling of the pairings between production sources and consumers (Bushnell, Carla Peterman, and Catherine Wolfram, 2008) . For example, a U.S. policy targeting purchases of oil from Canadian bituminous (e.g., 'tar') sands due to its relatively carbon-intensive production process could lead to increased Canadian exports to Asia rather than a reduction in tar-sands production.
Here we more explicitly model the various potential sources of carbon emissions throughout the supply chain. While we make some functional form assumptions for tractability, we try to capture the key elements of the problem in a general fashion. This allows us to examine dramatically different circumstances ranging from cases where the bulk of carbon emissions is far upstream to cases where emissions primarily occur during consumption. We can also examine cases where either domestic supply or demand may dominate the world market as well as cases where domestic firms and consumers play a small role.
II. Model
Consider two international industries that are vertically related. These competitive markets allow society to achieve emissions reduction goals at a lower cost. However, offset programs may increase emissions due to adverse selection. This paper asks: how does leakage, namely foreign emissions from source j (E j ), change with domestic policy i (@ E j =@ i )? With these carbon prices, the equilibrium is:
(1)
where prices are for foreign producers and consumers. We show that these policies' effects on leakage depend on: (1) whether the policy is placed directly on polluters versus upstream or downstream of them; and (2) the elasticities of all domestic and foreign supply and demand.
To see this, consider the linear market M1, as defined in (2), where we assume interior solutions for all producers and consumers and, for simplicity, D e D 1: 4
In the appendix, we solve for the following equilibrium prices and quantities:
where Q D Q d D Q u and all i and i are all positive and functions of the parameters in (2). 5 From this equilibrium, we can examine the comparative statics of a carbon policy. A marginal increase in S u will increase P u , while the other carbon policies will reduce it. The effects on P d are more complex as the price depends on P u . Here, a marginal increase in S u will increase P d because of its effect on the upstream market. A marginal increase in D d will reduce the P d because of a direct effect, 6 , as well as the effect on P u . Finally, the effect of S d on P d depends on the parameters: the direct effect, 7 , is positive, but this may be offset by the effect through the upstream market: 3 8 . Three potential sources of foreign emissions exist in this model. First, production upstream may result in emissions, E S u D r S u S u . In equilibrium:
which are increasing in P u . An example of this would be the emissions associated with producing crude oil from tar sands. Second, production downstream may result in emissions, 
which are decreasing in P d . For example, consumers using gasoline to drive a car. With this model we can demonstrate several points. First, the application of a carbon price on the point of the vertical chain responsible for carbon emissions will always lead to leakage. This is because the carbon price is applied to domestic activities alone and necessarily stimulates substitution to foreign markets. In the case of carbon prices on production, this effect is rather clear: all consumers substitute their purchases to (now) lower cost foreign sources. In the case of carbon prices on downstream consumption the effect is indirect. The consumption carbon price reduces world prices for the regulated product and its upstream inputs thereby stimulating increased demand for those products in areas without the carbon price.
PROPOSITION 1: For market M1, policies that directly target the source of pollution increase foreign emissions (result in leakage). 6
Second, within our model, what we call indirect prices on either the upstream inputs or downstream consumption of the product will not lead to leakage. In fact, foreign emissions may decrease. 7 The advantage of an upstream carbon price in regulating downstream emissions is that the carbon price effects input prices of both domestic and foreign downstream products. For example, a Canadian tax on oil produc- 6 Here is the proof of this proposition. Note that 8 D x=.x C v/ < 1, where x and v are positive. Thus,
6 C 2 8 =b are positive. 7 Don Fullerton and Dan Karney (2011) also find negative leakage in a model with two sectors competing over capital. When one market is regulated and increases demand for capital, this has spillovers to the other market and reduces emissions everywhere. tion would reduce emissions from the U.S. transportation sector. Similarly, by reducing global demand for a product, a domestic consumption carbon price reduces upstream supply from both foreign and domestic producers. 8 Intuitively, and as demonstrated by the model, the effectiveness of any of these policies in terms of reducing overall emissions, will depend upon the critical parameters such as the elasticity of domestic and foreign supply and demand, as well as relative emissions rates. To compare policies of equal domestic effectiveness, we calculate the effect of policy i on domestic emissions at source j, @ e E j =@ i . The ratio of the marginal leakage over the marginal reduction in domestic emissions is the same for policies that do not directly target foreign emissions, i 6 D j. 11 Perhaps more important is the net effect on global emissions, @ E j =@ i C @ e E j =@ i , where the relative ranking of the policies depends on the parameters of the model. 12 Namely, the implications of vertical targeting on 8 A special case arises when the upstream product is an exhaustible resource. In that situation, reducing domestic demand results in shifting consumption over time or space (Fischer and Steven Salant, 2010) . 
III. Discussion and Extensions
Our model shows when upstream regulation may be preferable to downstream, and vice versa. There is another advantage of placing the point of regulation on the upstream input. Namely, it is not as vulnerable to the reshuffling of the relationship between specific suppliers and consumers as is downstream regulation on consumers. This point is not directly addressed in this model as the taxes we examine are effectively on products, rather than emissions. This is because our model does allow for endogenous domestic and foreign emissions rates. A tax on the consumption of "dirty" inputs would create a domestic separation in prices between foreign and domestic inputs, while internationally the two products would trade at the same price. In this circumstance, the "dirty" inputs would flow to the markets where the tax penalty would not apply to them.
However, an upstream tax on the production of dirty inputs would shift inward the supply of those inputs to all markets. If the emissions are downstream, this will unambiguously reduce emissions, although if the emissions reside in the production of the input itself, there will be leakage from the "direct" effect of the regulation by shifting production of the input from the domestic market. Thus, for example a tax on U.S. cement, while decreasing world consumption of related downstream products, could increase emissions by stimulating production from less efficient Chinese facilities.
Note the potential role of border adjustments here. If an import tariff were applied to an upstream product in addition to a production charge, the policy resembles a tax on consumption of the upstream product, which is in turn equivalent to a tax on downstream production in our model. For a net importing nation, the border adjustment therefore can turn a direct policy that creates leakage into an indirect one that results in negative leakage. However, for regions that are net exporters, border adjustments as they are typically conceived would not eliminate posemitters have higher rates than their foreign counterparts, direct policies will be more effective. However, if foreign emitters are dirtier (r j > 2e r j ), then global emissions rise with direct policies. itive leakage. In this case, the increase in foreign emissions stems from reduced exports from the regulated sector, rather than increased imports.
There are several useful extensions to be pursued of even this basic model. The current model has strong assumptions that may be relaxed in future work: the production function (fixed ), emissions rate (fixed r ), linear functions, competitive markets, and vertical structure. A natural extension is the imposition of a carbon, rather than unit, tax on the various sectors. In the absence of technology to mitigate emissions, such a tax would not stimulate cleaner production. However, when a reduction of emissions rates is feasible, as in the case of switching to lower-carbon fuels, taxing emissions rather than production or consumption would have a different effect. Furthermore, within the context of this model, such a differentiated tax can capture further effects of indirect regulations such as reshuffling.
IV. Conclusion
This paper develops a simple model to evaluate the effects of upstream versus downstream regulation on leakage. Namely, if countries do not harmonize carbon prices, then several have voiced concern that domestic production would be replaced by firms in unregulated or less regulated nations. The implications of this paper are that direct regulation at the point of emissions results in leakage. However, indirect policies, such as a carbon price on upstream supply to address emissions from downstream consumption, may actually reduce emissions in other countries. We find that the elasticities of demand and supply affect the marginal effects of upstream and downstream policies on emissions in unregulated countries.
